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ABSTRACT: 
The US Presidential election cycle and its influence on the economy and stock markets is a widely 
studied upon phenomena. The significant power that the US President has over the Western 
world cannot be ignored from an economic viewpoint. The partisanship of US politics creates a 
great struggle between the two major parties, the Democrats and Republicans, where even a 
small number of votes may influence numerous aspects of life in the US and even internationally. 
The decision-making power of the US President has a significant impact, for instance on job cre-
ation, government spending, taxation, environmental policies, foreign trade, and global politics. 
In previous studies, there have been three major areas when studying the relationship between 
the US President and the stock market. The first line of study focuses on how the US Presidential 
election affects the stock market in the short-term. The second concentrates on how the four-
year US Presidential election cycle influences stock market performance, whilst the final verdict 
is focused on the partisan effect on the stock market, in which stock market performance is 
evaluated based on the political party of the US President. Although the effects of the US Presi-
dential cycle and the stock market are widely studied domestically, the emphasis on the inter-
national effects is minimal. 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the long-term effects of the US Presidential 
elections can be found in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway. The emphasis of this study is 
around the four-year election cycle and whether the empirical findings from the US markets 
spillover to the Nordic markets. The empirical tests are divided into three, one focusing on 
whether the stock market performance during the second year differs from the rest of the term.  
The second empirical test examines whether significant differences in market returns exist be-
tween the two halves of the Presidency, and finally whether US information variables influence 
Nordic stock markets. The monthly data applied in the empirical tests span from November 1992 
to October 2020, covering seven Presidential terms.  
 
The results convey that the US Presidential election cycle does not have an impact on the Nordic 
stock markets. Although the Nordic stock markets underperform during the second year of the 
US Presidency, the returns do not significantly vary across the overall cycle. Moreover, the Nor-
dic stock market returns do not significantly differ between the two halves of the US Presidency. 
Finally, the ordinary least square regressions indicate that the US information variables have no 
significant explanatory power over the Nordic stock market returns.  
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Every four years the United States of America hold a Presidential election, an event 
which is followed extensively around the world. Millions of dollars in campaigns, daily 
news coverage and constantly shifting polls excite and interest millions of people around 
the world. From a dozen initial candidates, only one will emerge as the leader of the free 
world. 
 
The US elections are a race between two major political parties, the Democrats, and the 
Republicans. The effects of the elections are far-reaching, due to the significant eco-
nomic and political power of the United States. The President of the United States has a 
significant influence over environmental policies implemented, law enforcement and 
even regulatory actions that affect government spending (Oehler, Walker & Wendt, 
2013). Belo, Gala and Li (2012) argue that on average the government spending, 
amounts to twenty percent of the US gross domestic product, thus affecting the cash 
flow of companies.  
 
During the Presidential election period, investors follow and analyse shifts in both the 
polls and the policies of the Presidential candidates to adjust their positions and mini-
mize political risk. Nippani & Arize (2005) recognize the relationship between political 
sciences and economics, arguing that they have a mutual impact on one another. An 
extensive body of literature has recognized the affiliation between the Presidential elec-
tion and stock market performance (Hung, 2013). Alesina (1987) found that the policies 
related to taxation, government spending and social benefits between the two parties, 
the Democrats and Republicans, differ significantly. 
 
Over the years, a cyclical pattern has emerged, which revolves largely around the same 
four-years as the US Presidential election. From this correlation has emerged the Presi-
dential election cycle theory (Weldon, 2008). Although the Presidential election cycle 
theory, and its effects, are widely recognized in the US, there has been a limited number 
of studies testing whether the cycle-effects exist internationally. Previously only Foerster 
7 
and Schmitz (1997) have applied data from European indices to test whether similar fluc-
tuations in market returns emerge internationally. Therefore, to find out whether the US 
election cycle has an effect in the Nordics, this study will apply monthly price index data 
from Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway from November 1992 to October 2020.  
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether the fluctuations around the US Presi-
dential election cycle can be found in Nordic stock markets. Thus, this study aims to pro-
vide a comprehensive understanding of the basic principles behind the Presidential elec-
tion cycle theory, by reviewing previous literature, and implementing empirical tests to 
discover whether similar patterns emerge in the Nordic stock markets.  
 
The significance of the Presidential election cycle theory is two-fold. First, the theory 
greatly challenges the efficient market hypothesis, as it suggests that a potentially ex-
ploitable anomaly exists within stock markets. Furthermore, by applying the results ob-
served, from previous studies provides a convenient way for investors to create excess 
wealth (Sturm, 2013).  This study will analyse whether investors who are focused on 
Nordic stocks should consider timing the market around the Presidential elections, and 
thus generate excess returns in the long run.  
 
The significance of this study is that to my knowledge, it is the first study to solely focus 
on the relationship between the US Presidential election cycle and Nordic stock market 
returns. Furthermore, this study will test whether the election cycle exists in Nordic in-
dices by applying a more recent panel of data, as the latest study applying Nordic data is 
by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), who applied a panel of data from 1957 to 1996. Whereas 
this study will apply data from November 1992 to October 2020. This study will extend 
the analysis by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) who focused mainly on the international 
returns during the second year of the Presidential term, by adding tests focusing on the 
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two halves and whether Nordic stock returns deviate significantly depending on the 
halves.  
 
The purpose of this study is to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. Does the US Presidential election cycle influence Nordic stock market returns? 
2. Do the stock markets in the Nordic countries underperform during the second 
year? 
3. Do the Nordic stock market returns deviate between the first and second half of 
the US Presidential term? 
 
 
1.2 Hypothesis development 
The US economy being the largest in the world, suggests changes in US economic policy 
and the globalization of the economy, should influence international economic and stock 
market performance. As discussed earlier, the political power of the US President has a 
significant impact on almost all aspects of life in the US, thus there is a likelihood that 
the policies implemented by the US President, regarding US employment, fiscal policy, 
taxation, or tariffs, will have international effects.  
 
Hence, this study hypothesizes, that the correlation between the US political cycle and 
the US economy by Nordhaus (1975) exists within the Nordic stock markets. Moreover, 
studies by Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Huang (1985) have found evidence of the Pres-
idential election cycle affecting US stock market returns. Furthermore, evidence of the 
impact of the US Presidential election cycle on international stock returns has been 
found by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), thus leading to Hypothesis 1.  
 




Allvine and O´Neill (1980) found evidence that the stock market tends to generate 
weaker or even negative returns during the second year of the US Presidency. Between 
1961 and 1978, Allvine and O´Neill (1980) found that the US stock market returns during 
the second year of the Presidential term were -15,2% on average, whereas the average 
annual return during the whole term was 6,3%. Similarly, after applying numerous vari-
ables in their regression analysis, Foerster and Schmitz (1997) concluded that the most 
consistent US information variable on international stock returns was the “Year 2” vari-
able, which was a dummy variable proxying the second-year returns. Thus, the second 
hypothesis in this study is as follows: 
 
H2: The Nordic stock markets underperform during the second year of the US Presidency. 
 
Both Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Huang (1985) found evidence of the stock markets 
during the second half of the US Presidential term outperforming the first half. Allvine 
and O´Neill (1980) applied a trading strategy, in which stock is bought during the last 
trading day of October during the second year, and sold on the last trading day of Octo-
ber, two years later. This trading strategy generated significant excess returns, in com-
parison to a simple buy-and-hold strategy, thus leading to the third and final hypothesis 
of this study: 
 
H3: The Nordic stock markets generate greater returns during the latter half of the US 
Presidential term.  
 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
This study is structured as follows. The second chapter will introduce the main theoreti-
cal backgrounds relevant to this study, presenting theories and frameworks related to 
the Presidential election cycle theory, either by supporting or contradicting it. This chap-
ter will also introduce a more in-depth discussion of the fundamental factors and ideas 
around the Presidential election cycle theory. Chapter three consists of a literature 
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review, in which results from past studies will be discussed and analysed. The third chap-
ter is divided into two, the first half focusing on the previous studies that concentrate on 
the effects of the US Presidential election cycle in the US and the second part discusses 
the effects of the cycle from an internationally point of view.   
 
Chapter four – data and methodology, will discuss which data is applied in the empirical 
part, and the justifications behind it. Then it will discuss the different tests and formulas 
applied in the empirical part, to review and justify the variables which are applied in the 
regression analysis. The fifth chapter examines the results obtained and discusses 
whether the US Presidential election cycle impacts the Nordic stock markets. Finally, the 







2 Theoretical background 
The following will discuss numerous financial theories related to the Presidential elec-
tion cycle theory. Arguably one of the most significant financial theories, the efficient 
market hypothesis, made famous by Fama (1970), is largely contradicted by the Presi-
dential election cycle theory, since it suggests that the capital markets operate efficiently, 
thus that one should not be able to, for instance, time the market. 
 
The discussion about the efficient market hypothesis will be followed by a section on 
market anomalies, focusing on the ways in which market anomalies can be exploited to 
generate excess returns. The next section will discuss the relationship between the US 
President and the stock market, and the ways in which the US President influences the 
economy and the stock market. After discussing the relationship between the US Presi-
dent and the stock market, market timing will be examined, as it is one of the most fun-
damental aspects in the exploitation of the Presidential election cycle theory.  
 
Finally, the main attributes of the US Presidential election cycle theory are examined, to 
provide an understanding on the ways in which the US election cycle influences stock 
market returns and the reasons behind the existence of the cycle. The understanding of 
the fundamental factors behind the theory are significant to comprehend the literary 
review and empirical analysis chapters.  
 
 
2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
The efficient market hypothesis refers to a theory made famous by Fama (1970) suggest-
ing that on the long run the capital markets operate efficiently. According to Fama (1970), 
a market can be described as efficient, when prices always fully reflect available infor-
mation. Fama (1970) argues, that the primary role of the capital market is to distribute 
the ownership of companies within an economy. 
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By making investment decisions, the market value of a company is constantly valuated 
based on the current perception of market participants of a company´s value at any given 
time. Market participants constantly utilize information affecting a company, which is 
then reflected on its market value. As mentioned previously, if the current prices of 
stocks are always reflecting all the information available, the market can be defined as 
efficient (Fama, 1970). 
 
In efficient markets, the value of all assets in the market are based on all the available 
information. This belief of the markets being able to process and apply all the relevant 
information regarding an instrument is the basis of financial theory and legislation (Fama, 
1965, 1970). According to Fama (1970) the efficient market hypothesis can be divided 
into three different stages: weak, semi-strong and strong form. 
 
According to Fama (1970) weak form efficiency in the market suggests that the value of 
an instrument already reflects all its past prices. This is also referred to as the random 
walk model. This means that investors are not able to predict future stock prices by prior 
prices, making the utilization of technical analysis inapplicable. 
 
Cootner (1964) defined the random walk theory by suggesting that if the price of a stock 
tomorrow is based on today´s stock price, the value of the stock price tomorrow is based 
on today´s price, rather than tomorrow´s. By that token, the weak form of the efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that changes in stock prices are caused by new information, 
thus making period to period changes in stock prices statistically independent (Fama, 
1970). 
 
The semi-strong level of the efficient market hypothesis suggests that the stock prices 
fully reflect all obviously publicly available information, such as earnings and news about 
stock splits (Fama, 1970). Arguments by Malkiel (2005) support Fama, as he conveys that 
the prices of equities can often change without delay, on the appearance of new infor-
mation. Therefore, Malkiel (2005) argues that investors are unable to generate above-
13 
average returns with arbitrage opportunities, especially without exposing themselves to 
above-average risk. Furthermore, corroborating Cootner (1964), Malkiel (2005) argues 
that stock market movements are unpredictable, when not considering the long-run up-
trend. 
 
Contrary to the semi-strong level efficient market hypothesis, Dreman & Lufkin (2000) 
argued that stock prices tend to react to earnings for merely a year after the earnings 
announcement. Dreman and Lufkin (2000) discovered that companies announcing posi-
tive earnings surprises tend to move upward, whereas companies that experienced neg-
ative earnings surprises tend to move downward. 
 
The strong form of market efficiency, like the semi-strong hypothesis, assumes that all 
obvious available information of the stock is reflected in its price. The significant differ-
ence between the semi-strong and strong level market efficiency is that the semi-strong 
assumption assumes that no individual has more access into crucial information related 
to the stock, and thus cannot receive higher profits by benefiting from the additional 
information (Fama, 1970). 
 
The efficient market hypothesis, as discussed in the previous section, suggests that no 
individual market participant will be able to “beat the market” in the long run. According 
to the hypothesis, no market anomalies should exist in the market, as the markets are 
assumed to be efficient. Supporting Fama (1970), Malkiel (2005) suggests that the 
strongest evidence of market efficiency is the inability of professional investors to beat 
the market. 
 
The following will discuss market anomalies and the ways in which anomalies in the mar-





2.2 Market anomalies 
Anomalies refer to deviations and irregularities in the market (Sawitri & Astuty, 2018). 
Moreover, Sawitri and Astuty (2018) suggest that a market anomaly can be defined as 
the cause of a deviation or irregularity in the efficient market hypothesis. By exploiting 
these deviations of the efficient market hypothesis, investors can generate abnormal re-
turns, which contradicts the fundamental principle of the efficient market hypothesis, 
that suggests no individual is able to “beat the market”. 
 
There are numerous market anomalies, each which diminish the accuracy and signifi-
cance of the efficient market hypothesis. For example, Roll (1981) attempts to explain 
one of the most famous anomalies, the small firm effect. The small firm effect, according 
to Roll (1981) is that with the same level of risk, small companies tend to generate higher 
returns than large companies. This contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, as inves-
tors should try to benefit from this, thus removing the underlying arbitrage opportunity. 
 
Arguably the most coveted anomaly, the January effect, largely contradicts the efficient 
market hypothesis. According to Haugen and Jorion (1996), the January effect refers to 
a disruption in the year-end prices of small stocks. Supporting other academics studying 
anomalies, Haugen and Jorion (1996) suggest that if the stock market were to be efficient, 
anomalies such as the January effect should be priced away by investors. Furthermore, 
ten years after Haugen and Jorion (1996) argued that the existence of the January effect 
had been persistent since its discovery 17 years ago, Haug and Hirschey (2006) still found 
evidence on the existence of the anomaly. The numerous studies around the January 
effect emphasize faults in the efficient market hypothesis, as these anomalies are largely 
known, yet investors can benefit from them. 
 
As maintained previously, anomalies should not exist in efficient markets and the exist-
ence of anomalies is an example of the markets not operating efficiently. Booth and 
Booth (2003) studied the relationship between the Presidential election cycle and stock 
returns and found evidence of stock returns being significantly higher during the latter 
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half of the Presidency. According to Booth and Booth (2003), the excess returns during 
the latter half cannot be justified solely by business-condition proxies. Thus, Booth and 
Booth (2003) suggest that the Presidential election cycle is another anomaly that chal-
lenges the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
 
2.3 The US Presidential party and the stock market 
As maintained previously, the effect that government spending has on the expected cash 
flows of companies is agreed upon by most economists (Belo, Gala & Li, 2013). Moreover, 
Belo, Gala and Li (2013) suggest that the uncertainty surrounding the effects of policies 
implemented by the President may have an effect on the rates that are applied when 
discounting future cash flows.  
 
Adjei and Adjei (2017) argue, that the differences in the regulatory and fiscal policies 
implemented by the two major parties influence both the macroeconomy and the stock 
market. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Bohl and Gottschalk (2006) found evidence 
supporting the Democrat premium, suggesting that the stock market generates excess 
returns under Democratic Presidency.  The following will discuss the ways in which the 
President´s administration affects stock returns and whether a partisanship effect exists 
in the markets. 
 
The Republican Party often supports more conservative values and a laissez-faire ap-
proach regarding to economic policy implementation. This was evident for example dur-
ing the Ronald Reagan era, as he even presented the following quote “Government´s 
first duty is to protect the people, not run their lives”. Therefore, industries providing 
goods and services that have malicious effects on for instance the environment or public 
health prosper during Republican Presidency. 
 
Sabherval, Sarkar and Uddin (2017) suggest that “sin companies” operating in industries 
such as tobacco, alcohol and gaming perform better under a Republican leadership. 
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Another effect discovered through their research is that the volatility, which refers to the 
changes of the stock price around the mean price, is slightly higher during a Republican 
Presidency. 
 
Riley and Luksetich (1980) studied the effects of Republican Presidency on the stock mar-
ket and found that the stock market, tends to prefer a Republican President, at least in 
the short term. The effect is evident, as the robustness tests conducted by Riley and 
Luksetich (1980) portray a consistent, positive residual after a Republican victory and the 
opposite after a Democratic victory. Therefore, the myth that the stock market prefers a 
Republican President is supported by their tests. 
 
The power of the US President should, in theory, have a significant effect on all aspects 
of life in the US. The substantial power justified the analysis of economic prosperity 
based on the political party in office. In theory, the laissez-faire approach, which is com-
monly associated with the Republican party, should support the economy. To an extent, 
this claim is supported by Riley and Luksetich (1980). Moreover, Santa-Clara and Valka-
nov (2003) found evidence that further supported the claim, as they discovered constant, 
significant excess returns under Democratic Presidency. Which suggests that investors 
are relatively sceptical of a Democratic President. 
 
The relationship between the elected President and the stock market should be greatly 
influenced by the political party of the President. As discussed previously, the pro-
nounced power of the President of the United States affects various aspects in business. 
Oehler, Walker and Wendt (2013) studied the effects of the electuary result on stock 
returns and discovered a decline in stock returns when a Democratic candidate is elected. 
 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) studied the relationship between the political cycle, 
party effect and the stock market. Their study discovered that the excess returns are 
significantly higher when a Democratic President is elected. The results obtained by 
Booth and Booth (2003) somewhat support the suggestions by Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
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(2003), arguing that the excess returns under Democratic Presidency are evident in small 
stock portfolios, but no such effect is evident under large stock portfolios. 
 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) tried to explain that the reason for the significant excess 
returns is caused by the investors being positively surprised by the policies made by the 
Democratic President, although the statement is only supported to an extent and is not 
able to fully justify the excess returns. Belo, Gala and Li (2013) found evidence support-
ing Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) regarding excess returns under Democratic admin-
istration but maintained that the party effect is significantly more concentrated in indus-
tries which are more exposed to government spending. 
 
Alvarez-Ramirez, Rodriguez and Espinosa-Paredes (2012) studied whether evidence of 
distinctive characteristics based on the party in office can be identified in the stock mar-
ket. According to Alvarez-Ramirez et.al (2012) the informational efficiency in the market 
is influenced by the party in power. Their study indicates that the informational market 
efficiency increases under Republican Presidency and decreases during a Democratic ad-
ministration. This results in higher profitability in small stocks under a Democratic ad-
ministration. 
 
Belo, Gala and Li (2013) studied the effects of government spending and political cycles 
on stock returns. Although unable to find a significant difference in average stock returns 
under the two major political parties, when studying the returns of companies with het-
erogenous governmental exposure – Belo, Gala and Li (2013) discovered that significant 
differences exist on the returns of companies with high government exposure. For in-
stance, industries that are significantly affected by policy decisions, outperform compa-
nies with low exposure by 6,1% per annum, while under-performing 4,8% per annum 
under a Republican administration. The results obtained by Belo, Gala and Li (2013) re-
mained even after controlling numerous variables, such as market value, book-to-market, 
momentum, beta and business cycle fluctuations. 
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2.4 Market timing 
If markets were to operate efficiently, investors should not be able to time the market. 
Sharpe (1975) defines market timing as benefiting from the macroeconomic fluctuations, 
i.e., being in the bull market and stepping out in a bear market. According to Sharpe 
(1975) a year can be categorized as being “good” if the stock market returns, including 
dividends, provide greater returns than cash. Similarly, a “bad” year refers to the contrary, 
when holding cash equivalents provides greater returns than stocks. 
 
Sharpe (1975) studied the benefits of market timing. Studying the returns of three in-
vestment strategies, one consisting of only holding cash equivalents, buy-and-hold and 
timing the market. Between 1929 and 1972, the investment strategy perfectly timing the 
market, i.e., only holding stocks during good years, generated returns of 14,86% p.a. on 
average, whilst the buy-and-hold strategy generated an average of 10,64% p.a. 
 
Admittedly, the evidence of the superiority of market timing by Sharpe (1975) provides 
significant excess returns, but the study was done in retrospect. Due to the impossibility 
of perfectly timing the market, year in year out, Sharpe (1975) also studied the returns 
of less-than perfect market timing. Sharpe (1975) argued that asset managers who utilize 
market timing as an investment strategy, and whose success rate of predicting whether 




2.5 The Presidential election cycle theory 
The US Presidential election cycle theory is a theory which suggests that the US stock 
markets follow the US Presidential elections in terms of returns. The fundamental prin-
ciple behind the Presidential election cycle theory is the attempt to provide an explana-
tion on a constant pattern of fluctuations in the stock market, which follows the four-
year cycle of the Presidential elections (Wong & McAleer, 2009). The basis of the theory 
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follows numerous cyclical patterns that emerge around the President´s administration. 
Although the Presidential election cycle is commonly seen as a four-year cycle, its actual 
length may vary from 40 to 53 months (Wong & Mcaleer, 2009). 
 
The cyclical fluctuation in market returns around the Presidential election emerge as fol-
lows, the stock prices tend to decline during the first half of the President´s administra-
tion, commonly creating a bottom during the second year, and then rising during the 
second half (Wong & McAleer, 2009). In his summary of the Presidential election cycle 
theory, Weldon (2008) suggests, that businesses prosper during the election year. The 
fundamental principle behind this belief is that the competing candidates often focus 
largely on making promises for the economy, for instance suggesting lower taxation and 
stable government policy (Weldon, 2008). Due to the promises given to the business 
environment, the stock market tends to prosper, thus creating the basis of the theory. 
According to Weldon (2008), during the past fifty years, a uniform pattern of highs and 
lows in the stock market has emerged, in fact, a total of thirteen identifiable stock market 
cycles. 
 
Weldon (2008) provides a comprehensive summary on the basic principles behind the 
Presidential election cycle theory and the main reasons surrounding it. As mentioned 
previously, the campaigning candidates propose policies that are beneficial to the econ-
omy, such as suggesting increases in taxation and governmental spending that may harm 
the probability of the candidate being elected.  
 
During the year following the elections, in what Weldon (2008) calls the “honey-moon” 
period, the voters generally act in a euphoric manner, waiting for the accomplishments 
of the recently elected President. According to the theory, during the first year, the newly 
elected President commonly begins introducing new policies. According to Weldon 
(2008), the common tendency to implement the new policies during the first year is due 
to the next election being so far in the future, that voters may forget the new policies 
that affected them negatively. 
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Due to the implementation of new policies, which often involves increases in taxation 
and higher government spending, the profits accumulated by businesses begin to de-
crease. The decline in earnings generated by businesses then have a negative effect on 
stock prices (Weldon, 2008). The decline in stock returns commonly reach the bottom 
during the second year, as evidence by Weldon (2008), Foerster and Schmitz (1997) and 
Wong and McAleer (2009) all obtain results indicating that the stock market underper-
forms during the second year. 
 
After hitting the bottom, Weldon (2008) suggests that the President´s administration 
tends to take a more voter-friendly approach in policymaking, as the administration be-
gins to anticipate the upcoming election. The new approach commonly takes a more 
conservative stance, which results to a decline in new taxes and policies, requiring gov-
ernmental spending. Therefore, the theory suggests that after the second year, markets 







3 Literature review 
The previous segments provided a comprehensive background of the theories related to 
the Presidential election cycle theory. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the 
prices of securities yesterday should not affect the prices of securities tomorrow. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, anomalies should not exist in efficient markets. However, 
academics have found numerous anomalies, which are well-known and yet still provide 
an arbitrage opportunity to investors. The following will discuss one of the anomalies, 
the Presidential election cycle theory. 
 
Through a thorough review of previous literature, this chapter will provide a great un-
derstanding of the underlying principles of the US Presidential election cycle theory and 
its effects both domestically and abroad. This chapter will also discuss the excess returns 
generated when exploiting the Presidential election cycle and provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the reasons why it exists. Moreover, it will provide an in-depth analysis 
of how the Presidential election affects the US stock market, and how investors may ex-
ploit this so-called anomaly.  
 
In the modern day, investors have a greater access to international markets than even 
before. Thus, this section will also discuss the previous literature on how the US Presi-
dential election cycle affects international stock markets. The following chapter is di-
vided into two, the first section reviewing previous evidence from the US markets and 
the latter, discussing the relationship between the US Presidential election cycle and in-
ternational markets.  
 
 
3.1 The US Presidential election cycle and US stock markets 
The relationship between US stock returns and the 4-year cycles of the Presidential elec-
tion has been largely analysed. Evidence of the existence of the cycle and its effects on 
the stock market are found by Huang (1985) Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Weldon (1996), 
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Booth and Booth (2003) and Wong and Mcaleer (2009). The previously mentioned stud-
ies found a statistically significant difference in stock returns between the first and sec-
ond half of the President´s administration. 
 
The inclination of increases in stock returns during the latter half of the Presidency is 
acknowledged by Hensel and Ziemba (1995), Booth and Booth (2003) and Zhao, Liano 
and William (2004), whom all obtained results indicating higher stock returns during the 
latter half. The adapted approach often results to greater confidence in the market, 
which continues up until the post-election period as the new President begins to apply 
the new political agenda (Sturm, 2011). 
 
Nordhaus (1975) provided a gateway to the numerous studies around the political busi-
ness cycles that followed. Nordhaus (1975) found a predictable and unilateral pattern in 
policy changes around the Presidential term. Corroborating the arguments presented by 
Weldon (1996), Nordhaus (1975) that suggest the Presidential term often begins with 
somewhat rigorous policies and ends with “potlatch” policymaking. 
 
Allvine and O´Neill (1980) were one of the first to conduct a study around the Presiden-
tial election cycles and stock market returns. According to Allvine and O´Neill (1980), the 
macroeconomic policy in the US experienced a significant change following 1960. Allvine 
and O´Neill found that between 1961 and 1978, the average annual returns of each of 
the four years of the Presidential term were as follows, 3,6%; -15,2%; 21,7% and 15%. 
Similar to the studies that followed, Allvine and O´Neill (1980) found that the probability 
of stock prices rising during the latter half of the Presidency was significantly higher 
when compared to the first half. 
 
Allvine and O´Neill (1980) applied a trading strategy, in which stock was bought on the 
last trading day of the October of the second year of the Presidency and selling the stock 
approximately two years later, during the last trading day of October, prior to the elec-
tion. By utilizing this simple trading strategy, Allvine and O´Neill (1980) were able to 
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generate an average annual return of 5,39%, which greatly outperformed the buy-and-
hold strategy which generated 2,08% per annum. 
 
Allvine and O´Neill (1980) suggest that the Presidential election cycle theory is a clear 
contradiction of the efficient market hypothesis. They applied two time-periods of data, 
one from 1960 to 1978 and one from 1966 to 1978. The reason for the two sets of data 
is that the political power over the US economy grew significantly during the 1960s, 
starting from the Presidency of John F. Kennedy. During the time-period of 1966 to 1978, 
buying and holding the S&P 400 generated 0,38% per annum, whereas the alternate 
trading strategy, exploiting the Presidential election cycle theory, generated 5,94% per 
year. 
 
Huang (1985) studied the connection between US Presidential elections and common 
stock returns. The results obtained by Huang (1985) corroborate the observations pre-
sented by Allvine and O´Neill (1980). Between 1961 and 1980, Huang (1985) found that 
the average annual differences between the two halves exceeded 24%. Furthermore, 
both Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Huang (1985) recognized that the political power 
over the economy has increased since 1960. 
 
Huang (1985) also tested the effect that the political party of the President has on the 
emergence of the higher returns during the latter half of the Presidency and argued that 
the cycle is evident under both political parties. Moreover, Huang (1985) found that the 
emergence of the pattern has been more pronounced since the 1960s. 
 
Huang (1985) applied two trading strategies, one where the investors invest in treasury 
bills during the first half of the Presidency and in common stocks during the latter half, 
and one where the investor solely invests in common stocks. From the two strategies, 
the first, significantly outperformed the simple buy-and-hold strategy. Additionally, 
Huang (1985) obtained results claiming that the Presidential election cycle is evident 
24 
under both Democratic and Republican administrations, yet the effects were even more 
pronounced under a Democratic Presidency. 
 
Stovall (1992) studied a period from the beginning of the 20th century to the 1990s, find-
ing only one example to which a significant decline in the stock market occurred in the 
election year, which occurred during Herbert Hoover´s Presidency in the late 1920s. 
However, Stovall (1992) argues that even despite the great stock market crash of 1929, 
the stock market did rally during Hoover´s final months, which is in line with the Presi-
dential election cycle theory, which Stovall called the Quadrennial Market Cycle. Unlike 
many others who have studied the cycle, Stovall (1992) suggested that the reason for 
the existence of the cycle is caused by hopeful and prosperous investors whom either 
anticipate a re-election to a popular President, or the change in power of an unpopular 
President. 
 
Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) studied whether political business cycles exist in the US. 
They applied various election dummy variables and macroeconomic variables, five dif-
ferent US stock indices and tested whether the political party of the President influenced 
this anomaly. By applying data from 1961 to 1992 of the following indices, the S&P 500, 
S&P 500 with dividends, Nasdaq composite index, the Dow Jones industrial average and 
a small-capitalization-index, Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) found a somewhat identical 
pattern emerging in all five indices. Moreover, when applying a variable testing whether 
the party of the President influences returns, Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) found no 
statistically significant difference between the two parties, which conveys that the Pres-
idential election cycle influences stock returns under both administrations. 
 
Similar to Allvine and O´Neill (1980), Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) wanted to test 
whether exploiting the existence of the Presidential election cycle generates excess re-
turns. Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) tested the returns generated of five different trad-
ing strategies, buy-and-hold, long or out (ex post), long or out (ex-ante), long or short (I) 
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or long or short (II). The buy-and-hold strategy, i.e., the benchmark, generated an aver-
age annual return of 5,2%. 
 
The alternative trading strategies suggested by Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) gener-
ated significantly higher returns on average, conveying that it is possible to outperform 
the market, contradicting the efficient market hypothesis. Furthermore, Gärtner and 
Wellershoff (1995) argue that the alternative trading strategies that exploited the Presi-
dential election cycle theory, generate excessive returns for investors, despite any con-
ceivable transaction costs. 
 
Gärtner and Wellershoff (1995) further suggested that their study provides a significant 
insight on the predictive powers that market participants may have. Previous studies had 
maintained that by reacting to news, investors may outperform the overall market. How-
ever, their evidence conveys that investors may react prior to the news, and thus outper-
form the market. When utilizing similar regressions for five indices, the S&P 500, S&P 
500 including dividends, the Nasdaq, the Dow Jones, and a small-cap index; Gärtner and 
Wellershoff (1995) found an almost identical pattern in each index. Moreover, Gärtner 
and Wellershoff (1995) found that the non-linear specification outperforms the linear 
specification significantly, arguing that it explains 14 to 18% of the variations in stock 
returns. Moreover, the authors did not find any effect of the dividends on their results. 
 
Weldon (1996) applied data from the S&P 500 index – which consists of the stocks of the 
500 largest companies in the US based on its market value at any given time. Although 
the S&P 500 does not represent the US economy, it is one of the two most followed 
economic indicators alongside the Dow Jones Industrial Average. During a 50-year period, 
Weldon (1996) discovered a uniform relationship between the stock market cycles and 
the Presidential election cycles. During the thirteen terms studied, the market was at its 
lowest during the first and second year of the four-year period 92 percent of the time, 
which supports the theory. 
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As previously mentioned, Weldon (1996) found that during the thirteen Presidential 
terms, 92% of the stock market lows occurred in the first half of the Presidency. From 
the lows in the first half of the Presidency 25% occurred in the first year and 75% oc-
curred in the second year, which largely supports the findings of Foerster and Schmitz 
(1997). Furthermore, Weldon (2008) found that most of the lows in the second year oc-
curred either during the second or third quarter of the calendar year. During the 13 Pres-
idential terms, the only outlier in the cycle lows occurred during the “Black Monday” of 
1987, which occurred during the third year of the Presidency (Weldon, 1996). According 
to Weldon (1996) this outlier may be ignored, as the market crash during Black Monday 
was a result of mechanical stock market factors. 
 
When analysing the other end of the cycle, Weldon (2008) found that the stock market 
highs occurred 85% of the time during the latter half of the Presidential term. The two 
outliers found by Weldon (2008) can be justified by significant changes in the political 
environment. The first deviation was caused by the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War and the second was caused by the resignation of President Richard Nixon. 
 
The results obtained by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) confirm the accuracy of the previous 
research, from which they deduct that the US stock market does follow the Presidential 
cycle. Foerster and Schmitz (1997) found that US and international stocks underper-
formed during the second year of the Presidency, in relation to years 1, 3 and 4. Accord-
ing to Foerster and Schmitz (1997) the US stock market generated an average of 20,5% 
during the third year of the Presidential term, 9,5% during the election year and 4,2% on 
the year following the election. Furthermore, they found that the average annual return 
during the second year of the term was -2,9%. 
 
Wong and McAleer (2009), found evidence that the incline in stock prices is especially 
evident under Republican administration, as Republicans have a higher tendency to ma-
nipulate policy to win re-election, than their Democratic counterparts. The findings of 
Wong and McAleer (2009) are substantiated by Nordhaus (1975), who suggested that 
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political business cycles are commonly manipulated by campaigning political parties, to 
increase the likelihood of winning the elections. 
 
Booth and Booth (2003) found, that after controlling factors that may affect the overall 
business conditions, such as dividend yield, default spread and term spread – the latter 
half of the Presidency still generate excess returns. Moreover, Booth and Booth (2003) 
argued, that the stock returns during the latter half exceed the returns of the first half, 
when controlling whether the President is serving a second term. 
 
Booth and Booth (2003) studied whether the Presidential election cycle in security re-
turns is solely a product of business conditions, by studying whether the cyclical pattern 
over the election cycle can be justified through economic and monetary factors. Booth 
and Booth (2003) applied a panel of data from 1803 to 1996 and found that the average 
returns per annum during the first half of the Presidency were 6,4% and 12% on the 
latter half. By testing different subperiods, Booth and Booth (2003) found that the exist-
ence of the pattern was even more pronounced during the 1926-1996 and 1946-1996 
periods, where the difference of security returns during the two halves was more than 
double during the latter half. 
 
Booth and Booth (2003) further tested whether inflation can explain the significant dif-
ferences in stock market returns between the two halves, finding no evidence, to 
whether a pattern emerges in long- and short-term interest rates. This indicates that the 
greater stock market returns during the latter half cannot be explained by higher infla-
tion. Moreover, Booth and Booth (2003) applied different business cycle proxies, which 
did not have an explanatory value for the emergence of the Presidential election cycle 
in market returns. They applied measures such as the dividend yield, default spread and 
term spread, of which none could diminish the effects of the Presidential election cycle 
on stock returns. 
 
28 
When studying the robustness of the Presidential election cycle and numerous economic 
variables, Booth and Booth (2003) discovered that one factor that may explain the emer-
gence of the cycle is that the party in power commonly alters its economic policy when 
the time of the election comes closer, thus affecting stock returns. Moreover, whether 
the President is incumbent or nonincumbent does not affect the emergence of this pat-
tern (Booth and Booth, 2003). This indicates that the pattern will emerge, even when 
controlling whether the Presidential term is first or second. 
 
Wong and Mcaleer (2009) found evidence that the new policies implemented during the 
President´s first year commonly increases taxes, involves more government spending 
and regulations – which then have a negative effect on the profits generated by busi-
nesses. Therefore, the earnings tend to decline as well. The number of policies imple-
mented by the President commonly slows down during the second year in office, when 
the President begins to implement more voter-friendly policies (Wong & Mcaleer, 2009). 
 
Wong and Mcaleer (2009) suggest that policy makers make promises of lower taxation 
and stable government policies, to convince the public that the economy will prosper 
under the candidate´s administration. Therefore, the stock market, which can be viewed 
as the leading indicator of the macroeconomy, tends to prosper during the election year 
(Wong & Mcaleer, 2009). 
 
As previously discussed, Nordhaus (1975) suggests political parties commonly manipu-
late political business cycles to win the election. Nordhaus (1975) further argues that 
regardless of the political party, the President´s administration often stimulates the 
economy prior to the election. Wong and McAleer (2009) argue that the empirical results 
suggest, that to win the election, the Republicans tend to stimulate the economy in a 
more pronounced way, when compared to the Democrats. Despite the more pro-
nounced policy manipulation to stimulate the economy, the stock market tends to per-
form better under Democratic administrations (Wong & McAleer, 2009). 
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Nguyen and Roberge (2008) found supporting evidence to that portrayed by Weldon 
(2008). Corroborating Weldon (1996), Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Hensel and Ziemba 
(1995) and Wong and McAleer (2009), Nguyen and Roberge (2008) found that the aver-
age return per annum was significantly higher during the latter half of the Presidency. 
Similarly, Johnson, Chittenden and Jensen (1999) analysed the returns of S&P 500 and 
small stocks, finding evidence of both being higher during the latter half of the Presi-
dency. 
 
When analysing the average annual returns of years three and four, Nguyen and Roberge 
(2008) found only one negative year since 1954. During the same time-period, Nguyen 
and Roberge (2008) observed a negative first year six times and a negative second year 
five times. Additionally, Nguyen and Roberge (2008) argue that the averages are not 
compelled by outliers. 
 
According to Sturm (2013), previous research has not been able to provide a clear and 
distinctive reason for the existence of the Presidential election cycle. Stovall (1992) sug-
gests that the definitive reason for the outperformance of the stock market during the 
final quarters of the President´s administration is that the administration and the Federal 
Reserve are more accommodating in their fiscal policy, whereas they are at their strictest 
during the early quarters of the Presidency. 
 
Sturm (2013) studied whether fiscal policy or monetary policy is the reason behind the 
existence of the Presidential election cycle theory. As discussed previously, numerous 
studies suggest that the President´s administration utilized its fiscal policy to stimulate 
the economy. Sturm (2013) suggested that although the argument regarding fiscal policy 
seems plausible, monetary policy should not have an impact on the Presidential cycle, 
due to the Federal Reserve´s autonomy. Similar to previous studies, Sturm (2013) also 
obtained results suggesting that the stock market outperforms during the latter half, but 
the third year of the Presidential term was the strongest. 
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When studying whether evidence of a relationship between fiscal policy and the Presi-
dential election cycle theory exists, Sturm (2013) found none, which contradicts the ar-
guments presented in previous literature. Then Sturm (2013) tested whether monetary 
policy affects the Presidential election cycle theory, obtaining no evidence for this being 
the case. Sturm (2013) discovered that of the 16 tax acts implemented during the period 
of study, 11 (68,75%) were implemented during the first year of the Presidency. There-
fore, Sturm (2013) suggested that tax legislation may be the explanatory factor behind 
the Presidential election cycle theory. Furthermore, Sturm (2013) contradicts many of 
the previous studies by concluding that the stock prices influence economic policy and 
not vice versa. Moreover, Sturm (2013) suggests that the strongest explanatory power 
behind the Presidential election cycle theory is tax legislation. 
 
Zhao, Liano & William (2004) suggest that one reason for the existence of the Presiden-
tial election cycle theory is that the President´s administration often stimulates the econ-
omy through fiscal, economic, and administrative policies during the second half of the 
Presidency, to increase the chances of the incumbent party being re-elected. Booth and 
Booth (2003) studied the robustness of the Presidential election cycle and numerous 
economic cycle variables. They suggest that one explanatory factor for the cycle is that 
the party in power commonly alters its economic policy when the time of the election 
comes closer, which in turn affects stock returns. Aligned with Weldon´s (1996) results, 
Shaikh (2017) argued that the stock market has a tendency of rallying during the election 
year. Shaikh (2017) further suggests that the market tends to rise after the winner of the 
election is announced. 
 
Oehler, Walker and Wendt (2013) discovered a significant relationship between the elec-
tions and the stock market. For instance, the stock market reacts more strongly when 
the party in office changes. This means, that when a candidate is elected from a different 
party than the one currently holding office, the stock market reaction is larger than when 
a candidate is re-elected, or when the new President represents the same party as the 
previous. 
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Further evidence regarding the effects of the Presidential election on the US stock mar-
ket was discovered by Jones (2008), as he found that the volatility in the stock exchange 
increases during an intense competition between candidates. Moreover, according to 
Julio and Yook (2012) a tight competition between candidates has a decreasing effect on 
the number of investments made by companies. As the uncertainty of which candidate 
will be elected increases, it correlates to the investment uncertainty of companies. 
 
According to Sturm (2013) the evidence supporting the existence of the Presidential 
election cycle is perplexed, as it largely contradicts the efficient market hypothesis. 
Sturm (2013) suggests, that if markets operated efficiently, the relationship between the 
Presidential cycle and the stock market should not exist, as it is a clear form of arbitrage. 
Sturm (2013) argues that the Presidential election cycle should not exist, since investors 
with the knowledge of how to time the market around the cycle would be arbitraged 
away, as investors would act in advance to benefit from the upcoming cycle. 
 
 
3.2 The US Presidential election cycle and international stock markets 
The globalization of businesses has increased the correlation between the economic per-
formance of companies. As the largest economy in the world, the political changes in the 
US have significant effects on the performance of companies globally. The following will 
examine whether the Presidential cycle in the US influences the stock markets outside 
the US. Although the effect of the Presidential election cycle theory on the US stock mar-
ket is largely analysed, the number of studies regarding the US Presidential election cycle 
and international stock markets is lacking. 
 
Foerster (1994) studied the election cycles in the US and Canada. According to Foerster 
(1994) the study conveyed that the significance of the political cycle is international, and 
the effects can be observed further than solely in the US. Foerster (1994) also argues 
that the impact of the US Presidential election cycle is at least as significant on the Ca-
nadian stock market performance as the Canadian election cycle. Studies conducted by 
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Foerster and Schmitz (1997) and Nippani and Arize (2005) found that the Presidential 
elections in the US do have a significant effect on stock markets outside the US. Nippani 
and Arize (2005) found that the delay in the announcement election results during the 
2000 US Presidential elections has a negative effect on Mexican and Canadian stocks. 
 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) studied the US Presidential cycle and stock returns of 16 
countries between the years 1957 and 1996. The tests conveyed that during the 39-year 
period, the stock returns during the second year, on average, were -0,66%. When testing 
the average annual returns of the years 1, 3 and 4, the returns were 11,68% for the same 
time-period. The results obtained by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) are in line with the 
results found from US stocks. 
 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) applied numerous variables, regarding for instance both lo-
cal and US macroeconomies and US monetary and fiscal policy, and found that the re-
sults were robust. Moreover, Foerster and Schmitz (1997) distinguished the existence of 
a statistically significant relationship between the US Presidential election cycle and in-
ternational stock returns in most of the sixteen countries they analysed. 
 
The results obtained by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) to an extent challenge Cosset and 
Suret (1995) suggesting that local political risk can be diversified by holding equity from 
numerous different countries. Cosset and Suret (1995) argued that diversifying an inter-
national portfolio into numerous politically risky countries may increase the overall risk-
return ratio. This is challenged by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) as they find evidence that 
the US Presidential election cycle is a non-diversifiable political variable. If true, investors 
with international equity portfolios should not be able to generate an excess risk-return 
ratio by international diversification, as suggested by Cosset and Suret (1995). 
 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) studied the monthly returns of 16 countries by dividing the 
years into four categories, each representing one year of the four-year term of the US 
President. Their studies showed that the average return during the second year was the 
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lowest in all sixteen countries except Italy. Furthermore, in eleven of the sixteen coun-
tries studied – the average returns during the second year of the term were negative. In 
twelve of the sixteen countries the average returns in the third year were the highest. 
The difference in the average returns during the second and third year is astonishing, as 
the average returns in all sixteen countries were -0,7% and 13,8% respectively. This indi-
cates that the US election cycle cannot be hedged geographically, challenging Levy and 
Sarnat (1970). 
 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) tested whether the average annual returns during the sec-
ond year of the US Presidential term were greater than or equal to the returns during 
years 1, 3 and 4. The results indicated that at a 10% significance level, the average returns 
during the second year were significantly lower than during the rest of the years in four-
teen of the sixteen countries analysed.  
 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) found no evidence of a pattern in standard deviation risk 
around the Presidential cycle, indicating that although there is significant evidence of an 
election cycle in most of the international markets studied, it is not the case regarding 
risk. Corroborating Nordhaus (1975), investors become myopic prior to the election, 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) suggest the same in international stock returns as well. 
 
Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Hung (2013) studied the effects of the US Presi-
dential elections on the Taiwanese stock market and found that the monthly average 
returns were the lowest during the second year of the Presidential election cycle, which 
is aligned with the previous results. However, the t-test conducted did not portray a sta-
tistically significant difference in the returns, which depicts that there is not a significant 
correlation between the US Presidential election cycle and the returns of Taiwanese 
stocks. 
 
Likewise, the robustness tests conducted by Hung (2013) do not provide statistically sig-
nificant evidence to support the following hypotheses tested: the bull-run election effect 
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of the US Presidential elections in Taiwan and the party effect in the Taiwanese stock 
market. Similarly, Hoe and Nippani (2017) studied the effects of the 2016 Presidential 
elections on Chinese stock markets. The indices of study were the three largest indexes 
in China, the SHCOMP, SZCOMP and SHSZ300. Robustness tests conducted on all three 
indexes portrayed no significant effect between the election results and stock market 
returns. Hoe and Nippani (2017) suggested the following reasons for the deficiency of 
effects, the lack of sophistication amongst investors and the potential manipulation of 
information in China, as the negative information was potentially monitored. 
 
Contradicting results were obtained in a study conducted by Sultonov and Jehan (2018), 
finding that the US Presidential elections have a statistically significant effect on the 
stock performance in the Japanese stock market. The findings suggest that the investors 
in Japan follow political changes extensively which creates significant changes in the 
stock market. Moreover, the statistically significant effect conveys a dynamic interde-
pendence of the Japanese economic prosperity and foreign political deviations. 
 
Nippani and Arize (2005) focused their study of the US Presidential elections on the stock 
markets of its neighbouring countries, Mexico, and Canada. During the Presidential elec-
tions of 2000, there was a delay on the announcement of the results. Nippani and Arize 
(2005) found that during the seven-day delay, both Canadian and Mexican stock markets 
were impacted negatively. This indicates that both, Canadian and Mexican investors fol-
lowed the elections closely. Bohl and Gottschalk (2006) studied whether the Presidential 
election cycle affects stock returns globally. From a panel of data of fifteen countries, 
Bohl and Gottschalk (2006) found supportive, but non-robust results of the domestic 
Presidential election cycle affecting only Austria, Canada, and the Netherlands. 
 
The evidence whether the US Presidential election cycle influences stock markets out-
side the US are two-fold. The results discussed previously convey that the US Presidential 
elections influence stock markets outside the US in some instances, for example in Mex-
ico, Canada, and Europe, but no statistically significant evidence is found in China or 
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Taiwan. The next chapter will discuss the data and methodology applied in the empirical 
part to test whether the US Presidential election cycle impacts Finnish, Swedish, Danish, 




4 Data and methodology 
The following chapter will discuss the data and methodology applied to test whether the 
US Presidential election cycle theory is applicable in Nordic stock markets to generate 
greater returns than a buy-and-hold strategy. To determine this, stock market data from 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway is applied. In this study, the stock market data 





The data consists of the following Nordic price indices (PI): OMX Helsinki 25 (OMXH25), 
OMX Stockholm 30 (OMXS30), OMX Copenhagen 20 (OMXC20) and Oslo Stock Exchange 
OBX (OSLOOBX) (Thomson Reuters, 2021). To test similar trading strategies, as Foerster 
and Schmitz (1997), monthly data is used. The decision to utilize these indices, rather 
than indices portraying all shares listed within an exchange is two-fold. First, the com-
mon exchange traded funds tend to benchmark the largest companies in the index. Sec-
ond, the largest companies in the indices are more likely affected by globalism, as the 
customer base of these companies, which are either the largest by market capitalization 
or most traded, are more exposed to global risks.  The data will span from 2nd of Novem-
ber 1992 to 30th of October 2020. A total of four Presidents held office for seven Presi-
dential cycles during the time-period of this study.   
 
As discussed in the previous literature chapter, the effects of the Presidential election 
cycle on the stock market can be tested in two ways. In this part, both tests are con-
ducted, one finding out whether there is a statistically significant difference in stock mar-
ket performance between the two halves of the Presidency, and one whether a relation-
ship exists between an individual year and stock performance. Some studies, such as 
Hensel and Ziemba (1995) tested the average returns of stocks in both ways, per half-
term and per year. 
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First, this study will focus on the average returns during each individual year. Studies by 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997), Booth and Booth (2003) and Weldon (2008) found a dis-
tinctive pattern in average stock returns by year. Therefore, like Foerster and Schmitz 
(1997), the data from each index is divided into four distinctive periods of time, so that 
the first year begins from the first trading day in November of the election year and ends 
on the last week of trading during the October of the following year. All the subsequent 
years during the Presidential term are divided in the same manner. Then, to test the 
second hypothesis, the data is split into two samples, to the second year and to the rest 
of the years.  
 
According to Foerster and Schmitz (1997), the average annualized returns during the 
second year of the Presidency are lower than throughout the whole cycle, and in many 
countries the market returns during the second year are negative. Thus, to test whether 
this second-year effect can also be found in the Nordic markets between 1992 and 2020, 
the average annualized monthly returns are benchmarked on years 1, 3 and 4.  
 
After testing whether Nordic stock markets underperform during the second year, the 
focus is set on determining whether a statistically significant difference exists in the re-
turns between the two halves of the Presidency. The policies implemented by the US 
President differ largely between the two halves. For instance, Sturm (2013) argued, that 
most new taxation acts are implemented during the first half of the Presidency. Whereas 
Weldon (2008) explained that during the second half of the Presidency, the US President 
commonly introduces a more voter-friendly approach, which often creates prosperity in 
the market.  
 
The results obtained from numerous studies from the US markets have provided com-
pelling evidence of the existence of a Presidential cycle in stock returns, which motivated 
me to test whether such pronounced differences between the two halves in stock re-
turns existed in the Nordic markets. Hence, the data is split into two, one spanning from 
the first trading day in November of the election year until the last trading day of October 
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during the President´s second year. The second sample covers the latter half of the Pres-
idency, from first trading day of November during the second year, up until the last trad-




As mentioned previously, the analysis will apply monthly price index data. To determine 
whether the US Presidential election cycle is evident in Nordic stock markets, a t-test is 
applied.  First, like Booth and Booth (2003) the Presidential cycle is divided into four 
years. Then the mean and standard deviation of annual returns during each year of the 
Presidential term is calculated. The mean and standard deviation of annual returns are 
calculated for all four indices, separately.  
 
Table 1. Term, election year, the respective President, and their party during the time 
of this study, which spanned from November 1992 to October 2020. 
 
Term Election Year President Party 
    
52 1992 Bill Clinton Democrat 
53 1996 Bill Clinton Democrat 
54 2000 George W. Bush Republican 
55 2004 George W. Bush Republican 
56 2008 Barack Obama Democrat 
57 2012 Barack Obama Democrat 
58 2016 Donald Trump Republican 
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4.2.1 t-test 
Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997), a t-test is applied in order to determine whether 
the means of two individual samples differ from each other.  To test whether the stock 
market acts efficiently throughout the Presidential election cycle, the means of both 
samples should be the same. The formula of the t-test is presented below.  
 
𝑡 =  
 ?̄?−𝜇0
𝑠/ √𝑛 
                        (1)  
 
Where x ̄represents the average annualized monthly returns of the second year of the 
Presidential election cycle in Table 3, and the average annualized monthly returns of the 
first half of the Presidency in Table 4. The symbol 𝜇0 represents the average annualized 
monthly returns of years 1, 3 and 4 of the Presidential term in Table 3 and the second 
half of the US Presidential term in Table 4. In the t-test, s represents the standard devia-
tion of the sample, and 𝑛 the number of observations in the sample. The t-test will con-
vey whether the two means of the two samples have a significant difference, where the 
assumption is that the means of the two samples are the same, if the markets were to 




The F-test was applied by Foerster and Schmitz (1997) to determine whether the vari-
ance in annualized monthly stock returns during the second year of the US Presidential 
term and years 1, 3 and 4 differ significantly. In this study, the F-test is applied to deter-
mine whether significant differences in variance exist between year 2 and years 1, 3 and 
4 (in Table 3) and between halves 1 and 2 (in Table 4). The formula for the F-test is as 
follows: 
 




2                        (2)  
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The F-test will convey whether the variances of the two samples differ in a significant 






4.2.3 Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997), the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test was applied to de-
termine whether the differences in medians of the annualized monthly returns differ 
significantly between the second year in office when compared to years 1, 3 and 4 in 
Table 3, and between the two halves of the Presidency in Table 4. Contrary to the stand-
ard t-test, which was discussed previously, the Wilcoxon Rank sum test focuses on the 
medians of the samples, rather than means. The results from the Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
test are presented as probability values.  
 
 
4.2.4 Conditional expected return model 
Similar to Merton (1973), Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) and Foerster and Schmitz (1997), 
the conditional expected return model is applied. To test both the unconditional ex-
pected stock returns around the US election cycle, the previous three tests are applied, 
whereas the tests that follow are applied to determine whether the second year or the 
first half of the Presidential cycle is a significant factor in determining expected stock 
market returns in the Nordics. The formula utilized when testing conditional expected 




𝑘 ) =  𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑘𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1




𝑘 ) represents the expected return of a stock market 𝑘 in a local infor-
mation set Ω𝑡−1
𝑘 , 𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑘  is the risk-free interest rate in country 𝑘 , 𝛽𝑖
𝑘 signifies the return 
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sensitivity of the local information variables in country 𝑘 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘  are the local infor-
mation variables in country 𝑘.  
 
Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997), the risk-free rate is subtracted from both sides in 
formula 3, in order to reiterate the expected market returns in terms of expected stock 
market risk premiums. Furthermore, as the purpose of this study is to test the relation-
ship between the US Presidential election cycle and Nordic stock indices, the set of in-
formation variables in country 𝑘 are substituted to solely US information variables. By 
substituting the local information variables to US information variables, the regression 
can solely test whether US informational variables potentially influenced by the US Pres-









𝑘𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝑛
𝑘𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀 +  𝛽𝑛
𝑘𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅2          (4)




𝑈𝑆 ) portray the expected stock market risk premium for country k 
conditional on the US information variables, 𝑍𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑢𝑠  are US information variables and 
PARTY is a dummy variable proxying the political party of the US President, TERM signi-
fies whether the US President is incumbent or nonincumbent and YEAR2 is the second 
year of the Presidential term.  
 
To test whether average monthly returns during the first half of the Presidential term are 









𝑘𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑌 +  𝛽𝑛
𝑘𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀 +  𝛽𝑛
𝑘𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐹           (5)




𝑈𝑆 ) portray the expected stock market risk premium for country k 
conditional on the US information variables, 𝑍𝑗,𝑡−1
𝑢𝑠  are US information variables and 
PARTY is a dummy variable proxying the political party of the US President, TERM signi-
fies whether the US President is incumbent or nonincumbent and HALF is the first half 
of the Presidential term.  
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Formula 5 is applied to test whether similar findings as presented by Allvine and O´Neill 
(1980), Hensel and Ziemba (1995) and Booth and Booth (2003) can be found in the Nor-
dic markets. The emphasis in formula 5 is in the final dummy variable HALF which proxies 
the first half of the Presidency, as studies conducted by the previously mentioned au-




The following will discuss the variables utilized in the two regressions applied to test 
which US factors have an impact on Nordic stock returns and to determine whether the 
US Presidential election cycle has an impact on Nordic stock returns and risk. 
 
The first US local information variable SHT is applied to test whether the US short-term 
interest rate influences Nordic stock market returns. The short-term interest rate is ap-
plied, as previous studies by for instance Fama and French (1988) and Ferson and Harvey 
(1991) indicate that the US short-term interest rates are able to predict US stock returns 
in a significant manner. Furthermore, Gultekin (1983) found that the US short-term in-
terest rates have a significant effect on international stock returns as well. Moreover, 
Foerster and Schmitz (1997) argued, that the expected inflation rates may be proxied by 
US short-term interest rates, and should correlate negatively with stock returns, there-
fore meaning that higher inflation results to lower expected stock returns. 
 
To test whether the monthly changes in US gross domestic product influence Nordic 
stock market returns, variable USGDP is applied. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) 
found that a pattern exists between the real US GDP growth and the US election cycle. 
Moreover, in the US, under Democratic Presidency, the real GDP growth was significantly 
higher during the second and third year of the cycle. (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 1997).  
 
Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) found that under Democratic administrations, a sig-
nificant increase in the quarterly US GDP occurs during the third quarter after the 
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Presidential election, as the quarterly annualized GDP growth during the third quarter 
was approximately 3%, and about 6% during six to seven quarters after the election. 
However, the quarterly real GDP growth tends to decline after the sixth and seventh 
quarter following the election under Democratic Presidencies, whilst accelerating under 
Republican Presidencies. By the fourth year, the real GDP growth in the US is unanimous 
under both parties.  
 
US information variable UNEMP is applied to test whether the US unemployment level 
affects Nordic stock returns. Nordhaus (1975) argued that the US President tends to ma-
nipulate the economy to increase the likelihood of being re-elected. One way in which 
the US President can influence the economic wellbeing is through job creation. By boost-
ing the economy through lowering the unemployment rate, there is a greater likelihood 
of the incumbent President being re-elected. Similarly, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) 
tested whether similar partisan effects that were found regarding the US real GDP 
growth, can be observed in the US unemployment levels around the US election cycle. 
Therefore, the variable UNEMP is applied, where the effects of the monthly changes in 
the US unemployment rate are tested on the Nordic markets.  
 
Similar to Hensel and Ziemba (1995), to test whether the political party of the US Presi-
dent influences the average returns in the stock market, a dummy variable PARTY is ap-
plied. The dummy was constructed so, that if the sitting President is Republican, the 
value is marked as 1, else 0. Although the tests conducted by Hensel and Ziemba (1995) 
conveyed that the party of the US President had no significant effect on US stock returns, 
the PARTY variable is still applied in this study. 
 
Moreover, the PARTY variable is applied to test whether similar results are observable in 
the Nordics, as they were found in the US by Riley and Luksetich (1980) and Santa-Clara 
and Valkanov (2003). Although the findings in these two studies are contradictory, both 
studies indicate that the political party of the US President is a significant factor in 
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explaining stock market returns. Furthermore, Sabherval, Sarkar and Uddin (2017) found 
that the overall volatility in the stock market is higher under Republican Presidency. 
 
Booth and Booth (2003) tested whether the US President being incumbent or non-in-
cumbent impacted on the existence of the US Presidential election cycle. Booth and 
Booth (2003) argued that the US Presidents tend to alter their economic policy prior to 
the election to increase the likelihood of the President´s party being re-elected. When 
applying the term-dummy variable, Booth and Booth (2003) found that whether the sit-
ting US President is on their first or second term, has no statistically significant effect on 
the stock returns. To test whether such an effect is also irrelevant in the Nordic stock 
markets, the dummy variable TERM is applied, where the first term is being given a value 
of 1, and the rest is given 0. 
 
In the regressions conducted by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), the authors concluded that 
the most significant factor explaining stock returns was the dummy variable ELECT2, 
which in this study is YEAR2. This dummy variable is applied to test whether the Nordic 
stock returns during the US President´s second year in office differ from the rest of the 
four years that the US Presidential term lasts. The dummy is constructed so that the 
second year of the US Presidency is proxied by value 1, where the rest are given value 0. 
 
To test whether the Nordic stock returns are between the two halves of the US Presi-
dency differ, a dummy variable HALF is applied. Studies conducted by Allvine and O´Neill 
(1980), Hensel and Ziemba (1995) and Booth and Booth (2003) all indicated that the 
stock returns tend to rise during the latter half of the Presidency. To test whether the 
half of the term has an explanatory power on the Nordic stock returns, a dummy variable 
HALF is constructed so that the first two years of the Presidency are represented by value 
1, and the latter two years by value 0. 
45 
5 Empirical Results 
The following chapter will discuss the empirical findings obtained by applying the tests 
that were discussed in the Chapter 4. The empirical results are divided into five tables, 
where Table 2 portrays the average annualized monthly returns and standard deviations 
in OMX Copenhagen 20, OMX Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX between 
November 1992 and October 2020. Table 3 compares and distinguishes whether there 
is a significant difference in the average annualized monthly returns between the second 
year of the US Presidential term and years 1, 3 and 4. Within Table 3 a standard t-test is 
applied in a similar manner as was applied by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), and an F-test 
was conducted in order to determine whether the variances of the two datasets differ 
significantly. 
 
In Table 4, like Allvine and O´Neill (1980), the data is split into two halves, in which the 
first half represents the two first years after the election day and the latter represents 
the final two years of the US Presidential term. Allvine and O´Neill (1980) divided their 
data into the two halves to test whether there is a significant difference in the average 
returns of the two sets of data.  
 
Table 5 tests whether the returns during the second year of the Presidency differ signif-
icantly from years 1, 3 and 4. Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997) a panel of US infor-
mation variables and three dummy variables are utilized. Finally, Table 6 tests whether 
the average annualized monthly returns during the first half differs from the average re-
turns generated during the second half, using the same US information variables which 







Table 2. The annualized mean monthly local stock market returns of OMX Copenhagen 
20, OMX Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX between November 
1992 and October 2020. (Thomson Reuters, 2021). 
 
Annualized Mean Monthly Stock Market Returns & Standard Deviations in 
OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 and Oslo OBX Between November 1992 – October 2020 
Divided into Each Individual Year of the US Presidential Term 
      
 
Mean Return Mean Return 
 
 
(Standard Deviation) (Standard Deviation) 
Index Full Sample Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
      
OMXC20 10.30 17.42 4.20 11.61 8.04 
      
 
(17.50) (17.88) (17.46) (15.19) (19.03) 
      
OMXS30 8.14 18.44 1.55 12.98 -0.30 
      
 
(19.47) (19.59) (20.16) (18.14) (19.42) 
      
OMXH25 9.55 18.06 10.68 11.98 -2.40 
      
 
(22.09) (25.28) (19.90) (19.66) (22.68) 
      
OSLO OBX 6.48 19.37 0.14 7.65 -1.07 
      
 
(20.90) (18.23) (22.29) (17.19) (24.49) 
      
Average 8.62 18.32 4.14 11.06 1.07 
 
(20.07) (20.46) (20.06) (17.63) (21.56) 
                
     
  
    
Table 2 displays the average annualized mean returns of OMX Copenhagen 20, OMX 
Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX between November 1992 and October 
2020. The data sample covers seven election cycles, and four Presidents, of which both 
major US political parties were represented twice. Similar to Foerster and Schmitz (1997) 
the local currency returns are obtained from price indices (PI), which means that divi-
dends are not accounted in the returns. 
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The summary statistics portrays, that the overall mean monthly returns for all four indi-
ces between November 1992 and October 2020 were 8,61%. The average monthly re-
turns during the whole data sample were the highest in OMX Copenhagen 20 (10,29%), 
second highest in OMX Helsinki 25 (9,55%), the lowest in Oslo OBX (6,48%) and second 
lowest in OMX Stockholm 30 (8,14%). When analysing the annualized mean monthly re-
turns of each individual term-year, the lowest annualized monthly returns occurred in 
Oslo OBX during the fourth year of the Presidency, and the highest returns obtained were 
from Oslo OBX during the first year. 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the second year of the Presidential term, on average, generates 
lower returns than the overall mean return of the whole term. This corroborates the 
results obtained by Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Foerster and Schmitz (1997), who also 
found lower mean returns during the second year of the Presidency, when comparing to 
the overall average return of the whole cycle. However, contrary to both Allvine and 
O´Neill (1980) and Foerster and Schmitz (1997) the annualized mean monthly return in 
the Nordic indices was in fact the lowest during the final year of the cycle, which accord-
ing to Weldon (2008) should be a relatively strong year for the stock market. 
 
Furthermore, on the contrary to previous studies, the average annualized monthly re-
turns during the second year are positive in all four indices, which contradicts the results 
obtained by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), where the average annual return during the 
second year was positive in only seven of the eighteen countries analysed. This also sug-
gests that there are no spill-over effects on the average returns to the Nordic countries, 
as Allvine and O´Neill (1980), Huang (1985) and Foerster and Schmitz (1997) found that 
the second year of the Presidential term was generally negative. 
 
One reason for the largely contradicting results to previous studies was that the data 
sample used consisted of two major disruptions in the stock market during the fourth 
year, as both the great recession of 2008 occurred during Bush´s final year and the crash 
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caused by Covid-19 occurred during Trump´s final year in 2020. One interesting factor in 
the results obtained is that none of the four years were negative for all indices combined 
on average, when compared to Foerster and Schmitz (1997). Although the average for 
all four indices is positive in all four years, all except OMX Copenhagen 20 exhibited neg-
ative returns during the fourth year. Moreover, the average returns during the fourth 
year are the lowest in OMX Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX. 
 
Another interesting aspect presented in Table 2 is that the standard deviation during the 
third year is the lowest of all four years, and the highest during the fourth year.  This 
indicates that the overall risk in the market seems to be the lowest during the President´s 
third year. Weldon (2008) suggested that the third year in office tends to be the strongest 
for stocks, as the US President commonly adopts a more voter-friendly agenda, to in-
crease the likelihood of re-election. 
 
The higher risk during the fourth year is somewhat contradictory to Foerster and Schmitz 
(1997), who found that standard deviation in monthly returns during the fourth year was 
lower than for the full sample and that the standard deviation was at its highest during 
the second year. Although the summary of statistics presented in Table 2 to an extent 
differs from previous studies, the higher risk level during the fourth year is aligned to the 
overall underperformance of the fourth year in general. Furthermore, as mentioned pre-
viously, the increased level of risk during the fourth year can also be justified by the two 
significant disruptions in the global economy, of which both occurred during the fourth 





5.1 Results from t-tests 
Table 3. The annualized mean monthly local stock market return of OMX Copenhagen 
20, OMX Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX between November 
1992 and October 2020 (Thomson Reuters, 2021).  
 
Annualized Mean Monthly Stock Market Returns & Standard Deviations 
in OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 & Oslo OBX Between November 1992 – October 2020 



















Rank Sum W 
Test p-value 
      
OMXC20 10.30 4.20 12.34 0.403 0.155 
      
 
(17.50) (17.46) (17.48) (0.987) 
 
      
OMXS30 8.14 1.55 10.34 0.151 0.282 
      
 
(19.47) (20.16) (19.19) (0.418) 
 
      
OMXH25 9.55 10.68 9.18 0.816 0.505 
      
 
(22.09) (19.90) (22.78) (0.034) 
 
      
OSLO OBX 6.48 0.14 8.61 0.202 0.197 
      
 
(20.90) (22.29) (20.38) (0.148) 
 
      
Average 8.62 4.14 10.12 
  
 
(20.07) (20.06) (20.05) 
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Table 3 presents the average annualized monthly returns and standard deviations during 
the second year and a combined subsample of years 1, 3 and 4. Similar to Foerster and 
Schmitz (1997), to determine whether the average annualized monthly returns are lower 
during the second year of the Presidency, the returns are divided into two columns, one 
displaying the average annualized mean monthly return, and standard deviation during 
the second year of the US Presidential term and the latter displaying the same infor-
mation during the rest of the Presidential term. 
 
The third column presents the probability values (P-values) for both equality-of-means 
and equality-of-variance tests between the second year and years 1, 3 and 4. The top 
value of the third column depicts the p-value of one-tail difference in means between 
the two subsamples, when the two samples of data are not assumed equal. The null 
hypothesis tested with the equality-of-means test is that the average annualized returns 
of the two subsamples are identical. The lower value bracketed in the third column pre-
sents the probability value obtained from running a F-test. Similar to the t-test for equal-
ity-of-means, the null hypothesis for the F-test is that the variances presented in the first 
two columns do not differ significantly. 
 
As can be observed in the first column, the average annualized monthly returns were 
8,62% for all years, 4,14% for the second year and 10,12% for years 1, 3 and 4. However, 
the t-test, indicates that the differences in mean monthly returns do not differ signifi-
cantly between the two sets of data. As can be seen in the second to the last column, all 
the probability values (p-values) are greater than 10%, indicating that the null hypothesis 
should be accepted. Although the probability values do not suggest a statistically signif-
icant difference in mean monthly returns between the two datasets, the actualized re-
turns, on average, were higher during the years 1, 3 and 4. 
 
An F-test was conducted to determine whether the level of risk in the stock market dif-
fers between year 2 and years 1, 3 and 4. The results from the F-test are presented as 
probability values in brackets, in the second to the last column. The probability values 
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indicate that the monthly variance in stock returns differs significantly in only OMX Hel-
sinki 25. The probability value of 3,4% indicates that that the null hypothesis can be re-
jected with a 5% significance level. For the rest of the Nordic indices, the results from 
the F-test convey that the monthly variance in stock returns is not different between 
year 2 and years 1, 3 and 4. 
 
Apart from OMX Helsinki 25, the other Nordic indices do not exhibit a difference in the 
variances of monthly returns between the two subsamples, which is in line with the re-
sults obtained by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), who found no consistent pattern in 
monthly return variances. Contrary to Foerster and Schmitz (1997) the standard devia-
tion is higher during the second year in OMX Stockholm 30 and Oslo OBX, and lower in 
OMX Copenhagen 20 and OMX Helsinki 25. 
 
Similarly, the Wilcoxon rank tests, which indicate the likelihood that the two sets of data 
have the same distribution, suggests that the null hypothesis should be accepted. Con-
trary to studies conducted by Foerster and Schmitz (1997), who found that international 
returns were lower during the second year of the Presidential term, the Wilcoxon rank 
tests indicate that the returns in year 2 and years 1, 3 and 4 have a similar distribution. 
Similar to the two previous tests conducted, the null hypothesis for the Wilcoxon rank 
test was that the returns of the two data samples do not differ significantly. The results 
obtained from the Wilcoxon rank test is aligned to the two previous tests, indicating no 








Table 4. The annualized mean monthly local stock market return of OMX Copenhagen 
20, OMX Stockholm 30, OMX Helsinki 25 and Oslo OBX between November 
1992 and October 2020 (Thomson Reuters, 2021).  
 
Annualized Mean Monthly Stock Market Returns & Standard Deviations 
in OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 & Oslo OBX Between November 1992 – October 2020 
Split into the Two Halves of the US Presidential Term 
 
 






















      
OMXC20 10.30 10.77 9.83 0.842 0.84 
      
 
(17.50) (17.77) (17.23) (0.730) 
 
      
OMXS30 8.14 9.95 6.34 0.548 0.26 
      
 
(19.47) (20.03) (18.89) (0.549) 
 
      
OMXH25 9.55 14.35 4.79 0.263 0.16 
      
 
(22.09) (22.76) (21.32) (0.415) 
 
      
OSLO OBX 6.48 9.70 3.29 0.359 0.31 
      
 
(20.90) (20.56) (21.20) (0.612) 
 
      
Average 8.62 11.19 6.06 
  
 







Table 4 portrays whether the average annualized monthly return and standard deviation 
during the first half and the second half of the Presidency differ in a significant manner. 
Starting from the left column, Table 4 presents the full sample mean return and standard 
deviation, to which the second and third column are compared to. Columns two and 
three present the annualized mean monthly return and standard deviation of the first 
and second half of the US Presidential term, respectively.  
 
The second to the last column presents probability values of equality-of-means and 
equality-of-variances tests. In the second to the last column, the top value presents the 
p-value of a t-test, with a null hypothesis that the average returns during both halves are 
identical. The bracketed bottom value portrays the p-value from an F-test, where the null 
hypothesis was that the variances of the two subsamples do not differ significantly. The 
final column presents the Wilcoxon rank sum value of both samples, where the null hy-
pothesis suggests no statistically significant difference between the two subsamples.  
 
Table 4 shows that the average annualized monthly return of the whole sample in all four 
indices was 8,62%, whereas the returns for the first and second half were 11,19% and 
6,06% respectively. When comparing the values of the subsamples to the average of the 
whole sample, the average returns seem to differ from the results presented by Allvine 
and O´Neill (1980) and Hensel and Ziemba (1995), whom both obtained results indicat-
ing that the average annualized returns are higher during the second half of the Presi-
dency.  
 
When comparing the average annualized monthly returns during the first and second 
half, the values indicate that the returns during the first half are higher in all four indices. 
Moreover, the average returns of both halves in all four indices are positive, indicating 
that investors should be invested in stocks throughout the cycle. The highest returns of 
the whole data sample, on average, are generated in OMX Helsinki 25 during the first 
half, with a mean annualized monthly return of 14,35%. The second highest average an-
nualized returns are generated during the first half in OMX Copenhagen 20. The lowest 
54 
and second lowest annualized average returns are found generated during the latter half 
in Oslo OBX and OMX Helsinki 25, respectively.  
 
When comparing the standard deviations between the two halves of the Presidency, the 
bracketed values convey that the standard deviation was slightly greater during the first 
half of the Presidency. The standard deviation was the highest during the first half in 
OMX Helsinki 25, and the lowest in OMX Copenhagen 20. Furthermore, the standard 
deviation of an individual index was the lowest in OMX Copenhagen 25 and the highest 
in OMX Helsinki 25. From all four indices, the only index in which the standard deviation 
was higher during the latter half was Oslo OBX.  
 
The results obtained from conducting the t-tests are presented as the top value in the 
second to last column. The null hypothesis, anticipating that the average annualized re-
turns of both halves should be the same, are accepted in all four indices. This means, 
that the returns do not differ significantly when comparing the two subsamples. Similarly, 
the probability values obtained from the F-test indicate that the null hypothesis is also 
accepted, meaning that the variances of the two subsamples do not differ significantly. 
Moreover, after conducting the Wilcoxon rank sum test, the results indicate that the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. All the three tests indicate that the two subsamples, Half 










Chart 1. OMXC20 annualized mean monthly returns per term year and whole cycle 




Chart 1 depicts the annualized mean monthly returns between November 1992 and Oc-
tober 2020. The blue columns portray the average annualized monthly return during 
each year of the US Presidency and the orange line represents the average monthly re-
turn of the whole term. One significant deviation in the chart was the substantial drop 
in 2008, which occurred during the fourth year of Bush´s second term. Although Chart 1 
portrays a total of seven negative years during the 29-year period of study, the stock 
market crash of 2008 is the most deviating. Other significant underperformances of Dan-
ish stock returns occurred during the burst of the dotcom-bubble, which can be observed 
in the 9th and 10th column. Another interesting factor which is shown in Chart 1 is that 
most of the negative years occurred during the second year of the Presidential term. 
Furthermore, corroborating Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Huang (1985), the third year 
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Chart 2. OMXS30 annualized mean monthly returns per term year and whole cycle 




Chart 2 displays the annualized mean monthly returns of OMXS30 between November 
1992 and October 2020. The blue columns signify mean monthly returns during each 
year of the US Presidential term and the orange line represents the average annualized 
monthly return of the whole four-year cycle. Similar to the OMXC20, Chart 2 displays 
that during the third year of the Presidential term, the OMXS30 generated negative 
monthly returns only on one occasion. Moreover, the average annualized monthly re-
turns during the fourth year of the US Presidential term in OMXS30 were negative in 
three occasions, in 2008, 2016 and 2020, of which the negative returns were the largest 
during the 2008 stock market crash. Other significant deviations occurred during the 
burst of the dotcom-bubble in the turn of the century, which can be seen in the 9th and 
10th columns. Except for the third cycle, the first year outperformed the whole term in 
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Chart 3. OMXH25 annualized mean monthly returns per term year and whole cycle 




Chart 3 portrays the annualized mean monthly returns in OMX Helsinki 25 between No-
vember 1992 and October 2020. The blue columns convey the average annualized re-
turns during each year of the US Presidential term and the orange line conveys the aver-
age annualized monthly returns of the whole Presidential term. Similar to OMXC20 and 
OMXS30, the most substantial deviations in monthly returns occurred during the dot-
com-bubble burst in the turn of the century and the stock market crash of 2008. Further-
more, Chart 3 depicts that the first year of the Presidential term outperformed the whole 
term on all occasions except during the burst of the dotcom-bubble. Moreover, during 
the second year, the OMXH25 underperformed the whole term in five of the seven cycles, 
which corroborates the findings of Allvine and O´Neill (1980), Huang (1985), Foerster 
and Schmitz (1997) and Weldon (2008). Chart 3 also indicates that like OMXC20, the 
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Chart 4. Oslo OBX annualized mean monthly returns per term year and whole cycle 




Chart 4 portrays the average annualized monthly returns of the Oslo OBX-index between 
November 1992 and October 2020, where the blue columns are the returns of each year 
and the orange line represents the average returns of the whole cycle. Similar to 
OMXC20, OMXS30 and OMXH25, the largest negative deviations occurred during the 
turn of the century, which can be observed in columns nine and ten, and the stock mar-
ket crash of 2008. Moreover, Chart 4 depicts the underperformance of the fourth year 
in Oslo OBX, as the fourth year was outperformed by the overall cycle in four of the seven 
occasions. Furthermore, similar to other Nordic indices, the first year of the cycle out-
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Chart 5. Average of OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 and Oslo OBX annualized mean 




Chart 5 displays the average of mean annualized monthly returns of OMXC20, OMXS30, 
OMXH25 and Oslo OBX between November 1992 and October 2020. The blue columns 
represent the mean monthly returns during each year of the four-year Presidential term 
and the orange line displays the average annualized return of the whole term. As can be 
observed from Chart 5, the annualized mean monthly returns have been relatively posi-
tive during the past thirty years. The markets were in significant turmoil only during 
three fiscal years, during the first half of Bush´s first term and during the final year of 
Bush´s second term. Although a third major disruption in global stock markets occurred 
during Trump´s final year, the rapid rise from the spring of 2020 took the average returns 
of all four Nordic indices positive for the whole year.  
 
Chart 5 indicates that during the nearly thirty-year period, the average annualized 
monthly returns in the Nordics were only negative once during the first and third year of 
the cycle and twice during the second and fourth year. Furthermore, Chart 5 represents 
only two negative election cycles in terms of Nordic stock market returns. Both negative 
cycles occurred under Bush´s administration. The average annualized return during 
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5.2 Regression Results 
Table 5. Ordinary least square regression results testing the effects of US information 
variables on Nordic stock market returns (Thomson Reuters, 2021). 
 
Regressions of Local Currency Monthly Stock Returns in OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 
& Oslo OBX Between November 1992 – October 2020 Utilizing US Information  
Variables SHT, USGDP, UNEMP & Dummy Variables PARTY, TERM and YEAR2 
 
  
     
 OMXC20 OMXS30 OMXH25 OSLO OBX 
     
Constant 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
     
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.059) 
     
SHT 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
     
 (0.001) (0.087) (0.059) (0.002) 
     
USGDP 0.11 0.25 0.29 0.26 
     
 (0.137) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
UNEMP 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 
     
 (0.062) (0.042) (0.021) (0.013) 
     
PARTY - 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.01 
     
 (0.041) (0.007) (0.036) (0.148) 
     
TERM - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.01 
     
 (0.632) (0.963) (0.687) (0.713) 
     
YEAR2 - 0.01 - 0.01 0.01 - 0.01 
     
 (0.232) (0.222) (0.998) (0.263) 
     
Adj. R2 0.049 0.046 0.045 0.060 
     
Durbin Watson 1.938 1.981 1.659 1.860 
     
S.E. of Regression 0.171 0.190 0.216 0.203 
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Table 5 portrays the coefficients and probability values of each variable utilized in the 
regression. The first information variable, SHT proxies the monthly changes in the US 3-
month T-Bill rate. In theory, interest rates have a negative correlation with expected stock 
returns (Foerster & Schmitz, 1997). The information US variable, USGDP is utilized to test 
whether monthly changes in the US gross domestic product influence the returns of Nor-
dic stock markets.  
 
According to Nordhaus (1975), the US unemployment rate tends to decrease when the 
election date approaches, as the US President attempts to increase the likelihood of re-
election by boosting the economy, therefore the US variable UNEMP is utilized. Finally, 
this ordinary least square regression applied three different dummy variables.  
 
Similar to Huang (1985) dummy variable PARTY was applied in order to test whether the 
political party of the US President has an effect on the existence of the Presidential elec-
tion cycle. The dummy variable TERM tests whether the significance of the Presidential 
election cycle effect is influenced by whether the US President is serving their first or 
second term. Finally, the dummy variable YEAR2 is utilized to test whether the stock 
market tends to underperform during the second half of the Presidency.  
 
As can be seen from table 5. the short-term interest rate SHT has a weak, positive corre-
lation with OMXC20 and Oslo OBX at a 5% significance level, and in all four Nordic indices 
at a 10% significance level. Although the p-values, which are presented in brackets, indi-
cates a statistical significance between the two variables, the coefficient is extremely 
weak, and thus it can be argued that monthly changes in the US short-term interest rates 
have a little to no effect on monthly Nordic stock market returns.   
 
Table 5 portrays that a statistically significant positive relationship exists between US 
gross domestic product and all other Nordic stock market indices except the OMXC20. 
The probability values indicate, that at a 5% significance level, monthly changes in the 
US gross domestic product do affect stock market returns in Sweden, Finland, and 
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Norway. Moreover, the coefficients indicate, that of the three US information variables 
applied in the regression, monthly changes in the US gross domestic product seem to 
have the largest correlations to monthly changes in stock market returns.  
 
Monthly changes in the US unemployment rate seem to have a minimal, yet statistically 
significant correlation with Nordic stock market indices. As portrayed on the fourth row 
in Table 5, the relationship between the US unemployment rate and monthly stock mar-
ket returns in OMXS30, OMXH25 and Oslo OBX is statistically significant at a 5% signifi-
cance level, and in OMXC20 at a 10% significance level. Although statistically significant, 
the overall coefficient in each of the four Nordic stock market indices is relatively weak.  
 
The dummy variables convey some interesting results when testing the effect of US var-
iables on Nordic stock market returns. For instance, there is an extremely weak, negative 
relationship between the PARTY dummy variable and all four indices. Although the cor-
relation is extremely weak, it does indicate that the relationship between a Republican 
President and Nordic stock market returns are denoted negative.  
 
The coefficient of the dummy TERM seems to have no correlation with the Nordic stock 
market returns, and the significance of the term is extremely low as well. Finally, the 
dummy YEAR2 proxying the second year conveys no significance. Therefore, as also ob-
served in the previous tables, the monthly returns in Nordic stock markets during the 
second year of the Presidential term do not significantly differ from the returns of any 
other year during the Presidential term.  
 
Furthermore, when analysing the other factors, it seems that the independent variables 
utilized in this regression do not have a significant effect on the dependent variable, 
which in this case was a Nordic stock market index. Especially the dummy variable YEAR2, 
indicates, that the second-year effect does not have a statistically significant impact on 
Nordic stock returns, thus rejecting the second hypothesis, which suggested that returns 
during the second year are significantly lower during the second year. Although some 
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variables exhibit some degree of significance, for instance the adjusted R-squared per-
petuates that the US information variables are not able to explain monthly Nordic stock 
market returns, as the highest adjusted R-squared is able to only account for 6% of the 



























Table 6. Ordinary least regression results testing the effects of US information variables 
on Nordic stock market returns (Thomson Reuters, 2021). 
 
Regressions of Local Currency Monthly Stock Returns in OMXC20, OMXS30, OMXH25 
& Oslo OBX Between November 1992 – October 2020 Utilizing US Information 
Variables SHT, USGDP, UNEMP & Dummy Variables PARTY, TERM and HALF 
  
 
     
 OMXC20 OMXS30 OMXH25 OSLO OBX 
     
Constant 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.064) (0.338) 
     
SHT 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
     
 (0.001) (0.088) (0.057) (0.002) 
     
USGDP 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.26 
     
 (0.151) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) 
     
UNEMP 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.14 
     
 (0.059) (0.041) (0.019) (0.012) 
     
PARTY - 0.01 - 0.02 - 0.01 - 0.01 
     
 (0.041) (0.007) (0.036) (0.148) 
     
TERM - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.02 0.01 
     
 (0.633) (0.965) (0.693) (0.709) 
     
HALF 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     
 (0.900) (0.662) (0.249) (0.411) 
     
Adj. R2 0.046 0.042 0.049 0.058 
     
Durbin Watson 1.925 1.970 1.663 1.844 
     
S.E. of Regression 0.172 0.191 0.215 0.203 
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Similar to Table 5, Table 6 tests whether US information variables explain the stock mar-
ket returns in Nordic countries. The probability values of the first independent variable 
SHT, which are presented in brackets, indicate that the US short term interest rate has a 
statistically significant effect on all four Nordic indices when a 10% significance level is 
applied. However, although the null hypothesis, which in this case states no statistical 
significance, is rejected, the overall coefficients between the short-term interest rate and 
the dependent variable are extremely weak, indicating merely no correlation between 
the two variables.  
 
Monthly changes in the US gross domestic product seem to influence the changes in the 
Nordic stock market indices. All four indices, except OMX Copenhagen 20 portray a sta-
tistically significant, positive correlation with the changes in the US gross domestic prod-
uct. Similarly, the p-values in the fourth row, which tests the relationship between US 
unemployment rate and Nordic indices, portrays a statistically significant coefficient with 
all indices and the US unemployment rate at a 10% significance level and at a 5% signif-
icance level in all indices except the OMX Copenhagen 20.  
 
The dummy variable PARTY which is given a value 1 when the President represents the 
Republican party and 0 when the President is a democrat, indicates a weak, negative 
relationship with all four Nordic indices. Although the relationship is statistically signifi-
cant with all indices except the Oslo OBX, the coefficient is extremely weak and thus 
should not be emphasized.  
 
The dummy variables TERM and HALF indicate an extremely weak coefficient with all 
four Nordic indices. Moreover, the p-values, which are represented in brackets in all four 
indices convey no statistically significant effect, which suggests that all the dummy vari-
ables applied are irrelevant in explaining Nordic stock returns.  
 
Thus, the third hypothesis, suggesting that the Nordic stock markets outperform during 
the latter half of the US Presidential term can be rejected. The dummy variable HALF, 
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indicates, that the difference in Nordic stock returns between the two halves of the Pres-
idency is not statistically significant. Thus, the trading strategy suggested by Allvine and 
O´Neill (1980) would have not generated excess returns in the Nordic stock markets be-
tween November 1992 and October 2020.  
 
The t-test, F-test, Wilcoxon rank sum test and the two regressions indicate that the US 
Presidential election cycle does not affect Nordic stock market returns. As can be seen 
in Table 2, the average annualized monthly returns during the second year of the Presi-
dency are lower than during the overall cycle. Table 2 portrays that the overall annualized 
mean monthly return between November 1992 and October 2020 was 8,61%.  
 
Previous studies by Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Foerster and Schmitz (1997) found 
that the average annualized return during the second year of the Presidential term is 
significantly lower than during all the other years, and in many cases negative. However, 
this study found evidence which indicates that the average annualized monthly return 
during the second year was positive in all four indices, and 4,14% on average.  
 
Contrary to previous studies, the second year of the cycle generated higher returns than 
the final, fourth year of the cycle, which Weldon (2008) argued of being a generally 
strong year for stock returns. Moreover, studies by Allvine and O´Neill (1980) and Huang 
(1985) both suggest that the stock markets tend to perform better during the latter half 
of the Presidency. However, between 1992 and 2020, the Nordic stock markets did not 
outperform during the second half in a statistically significant manner.  
 
The t-tests and regressions were applied to define, whether the Nordic stock market re-
turns fluctuates around the US Presidential election cycle. The first hypothesis, suggest-
ing that a US Presidential election cycle exists in Nordic stock markets can be rejected. 
During the nearly thirty-year time-period, the Nordic stock returns did not follow a pre-
dictable pattern, as was suggested by Weldon (2008).  
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There are several reasons for the pattern not emerging. One of the most significant rea-
sons is that two of the three major stock market crashes between 1992 and 2020 oc-
curred during the fourth year of the Presidential term. Both the stock market crash of 
2008 and the brief crash after the spread of Covid-19 had significant effects on the 
monthly price data, as the data sample covered only seven cycles. Thus, disruptions in 
global economy have a significant effect on the data applied.  
 
As two of the three major economic disruptions occurred during the fourth year of the 
term, the first year of the Presidency was relatively strong in comparison. As can be seen 
in Chart 5, the first year of the sample was extremely strong, as the Nordic stock markets 
were strongly recovering from the 1991 economic turmoil. Similarly, during Obama´s 
first year in office, the stock markets bottomed during the spring of 2009, and started a 














The purpose of this study was to determine whether similar evidence to the existence 
of the US Presidential election cycle that is found in the US markets can be found in 
Nordic markets. A vast body of previous literature from the US has emphasized the sig-
nificant benefits exploiting the US Presidential election cycle in the stock market. Alt-
hough the evidence from the US is recognized, there is only a limited number of studies 
examining whether the effects of the US Presidential election cycle are found on an in-
ternational level. This study, to my knowledge, was the first to solely analyse the rela-
tionship between Nordic stock market indices and the US Presidential election cycle.  
 
The data consisted of monthly price index data from Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Nor-
way between November 1992 and October 2020, spanning through seven US Presiden-
tial terms. During the nearly thirty-year period, the US was led by four Presidents, Dem-
ocratic Bill Clinton and Barack Obama and Republican George W. Bush and Donald Trump. 
Moreover, although the Nordic stock markets generated positive yearly returns during 
the period of study, there were three major disruptions in the stock market, the burst of 
the Dotcom-bubble in the turn of the century, the Great Recession in 2008 and the brief 
stock market crash in early 2020.   
 
This study found that the effects of the US Presidential election cycle do not spill over to 
the Nordic countries. According to previous studies, the second year of the Presidential 
election term is supposed to be the worst return-wise. Although the t-tests indicate that 
the average annualized monthly returns during the second year are lower than during 
the overall term, this study found that the average returns are lowest during the election 
year. Moreover, unlike previous studies, the average returns during the second year of 
the Presidential term are not negative in the Nordics. Similarly, unlike some previous 
studies, the difference of average returns did not significantly differ between the first 
and second half of the Presidency.  
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The tests and regressions conducted in this study convey that investors should not try to 
exploit the US Presidential election cycle theory in Nordic indices, to outperform a simple 
buy-and-hold strategy. Although the average annualized monthly returns during the sec-
ond year of the Presidency are lower than during the overall term, as the returns during 
the second year are not negative, investors should be invested in the market throughout 
the cycle.  
 
Although not explicitly tested in this thesis, the likelihood of the Presidential election 
cycle existing in the US between November 1992 and October 2020 is relatively low as 
well. Although the US and Nordics are not fully correlated, the stock market crashes be-
tween 1992 and 2020 were all global, indicating that the Presidential election cycle the-
ory would not apply in the US either. One significant limitation acknowledged in this 
study is the relatively short time-period. As the 1992 was the first year where index data 
for a whole election cycle is found for all four indices, the amount of data points is rela-
tively limited, meaning that significant changes in monthly returns also have more sig-
nificant effects on the overall results. Thus, all three hypotheses stated for this study are 
rejected, as there is no indication of the existence of a US election cycle in Nordic stock 
markets between November 1992 and October 2020.  
 
Even though the results in this study convey that the Nordic stock markets do not follow 
the US Presidential election cycle, future studies could examine whether different indus-
tries in the Nordics follow the US Presidential cycle more closely than the general price 
indices. As some industries are more involved with the US, the results may convey that 
some industries in the Nordics do follow the US election cycle. Furthermore, interesting 
ideas for future studies would be to test whether domestic election cycles exist in Nordic 






Adjei, F. & Adjei, M. (2017). Political cycles, investor sentiment, and stock market re- 
turns. Journal of Finance and Economics, 5(1), 1-10. 
https://doi.org/10.12691/jfe-5-1-1 
 
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(3), 651-678. 
 
Alesina, A., Roubini, N. & Cohen, G. D. (1997). Political cycles and the macroeconomy.  
MIT Press. 
 
Allvine, F. & O'Neill, D. (1980). Stock market returns and the Presidential election cycle: 
implications for market efficiency. Financial Analysts Journal, 36(5), 49. 
 https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v36.n5.49 
 
Alvarez-Ramirez, J., Rodriguez, E. & Espinosa-Paredes, G. (2012). A partisan effect in the 
efficiency of the US stock market. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Appli-
 cations, 391(20),  4923-4932. https://doi: 10.1016/j.physa.2012.05.005 
 
Belo, F., Gala, V. D. & Li, J. (2013). Government spending, political cycles, and the cross 
section of stock returns. Journal of financial economics, 107(2), 305-324. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.08.016 
 
Bohl, M. T. & Gottschalk, K. (2006). International evidence on the Democrat premium  
and the Presidential cycle effect. The North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 17(2), 107-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2005.10.001 
 
Booth, J. R. & Booth, L. C. (2003). Is Presidential cycle in security returns merely a  
reflection of business conditions? Review of Financial Economics, 12(2), 131-159. 
 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1058-3300(02)00061-7 
71 
Cootner, P. H. (1964). The random character of stock market prices. Cambridge, Mass:  
M.I.T.(ed). 
 
Cosset, J. & Suret, J. (1995). Political risk and the benefits of international portfolio 
diversification. Journal of International Business Studies, 26(2), 301. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490175 
 
Cox, J., Ingersoll, J. & Ross, S. (1985). An intertemporal general equilibrium model of  
asset prices. Econometrica, 53, 363-384.  
 
Dreman, D. N. & Lufkin, E. A. (2000). Investor overreaction: evidence that its basis is 
psychological. The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, 1(1), 61-75. 
https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327760JPFM0101_06 
 
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The Journal of Business: B,  
38(1), 34-105. https://doi:10.1086/294743 
 
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A review of theory and empirical work. 
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.  
https://doi:10.1086/294743DOI: 10.2307/2325486 
 
Fama, E. & French, K. (1988). Dividend yields and expected stock returns. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 22(1), 3. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(88)90020-7 
 
Ferson, W. & Harvey, C. (1991). The variation of economic risk premiums. The Journal  
of Political Economy, 99(2), 385. https://doi.org/10.1086/261755 
 
Foerster, S. (1994). Stock markets performance and elections: Made in-Canada  
effects? Canadian Investment Review, 7(2), 39-42. 
 
72 
Foerster, S. R. & Schmitz, J. J. (1997). The transmission of U.S. election cycles to 
international stock returns. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(1), 1. 
 https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490089 
 
Gärtner, M. & Wellershoff, K. (1995). Is there an election cycle in American stock returns?  
International Review of Economics and Finance, 4(4), 387-410. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/1059-0560(95)90036-5 
 
Gultekin, N. (1983). Stock market returns and inflation: Evidence from other countries.  
Journal of Finance 38, 49-65.  
 
Haug, M. & Hirschey, M. (2006). The January effect. Financial Analysts Journal, 62(5),  
78-88. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v62.n5.4284 
 
Haugen, R. & Jorion, P. (1996). The January effect: Still there after all these years.  
Financial Analysts Journal, 52(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v52.n1.1963 
 
Hensel, C.R. and Ziemba, W.T. (1995), United States investment returns during demo- 
cratic and republican administrations, 1928-1993, Financial Analysts Journal,  51 
(2), pp. 61-69. 
 
Hoe, S. & Nippani, S. (2017). 2016 U.S. Presidential election and stock markets in China. 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 9(7), p.32. 
doi:10.5539/ijef.v9n7p32 
 
Huang, R. D. (1985). Common stock returns and Presidential elections. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 41(2), 58-61. https://doi.org/10.2469/faj.v41.n2.58 
 
Hung, L. U.S. Presidential elections and the Taiwanese stock market. Issues & Studies, 
49(1), 71-97. 
73 
Johnson, R., Chittenden, W. & Jensen, G. (1999). Presidential politics, stocks, bonds,  
bills, and inflation - Some new differences identified. Journal Of Portfolio Man-
agement, 26(1), 27-31. https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1999.319771 
 
Jones, R.J. (2008) The state of Presidential election forecasting: the 2004 experience. 
International Journal of Forecasting, 24(2), 310-321. 
 
Julio, B. & Yook, Y. (2012). Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. The 
Journal of Finance, 67(1), 45-82. 
 
Levy, H. & Sarnat, M. (1970). International diversification of investment portfolios. The  
American Economic Review, 60(4), 668. 
 
Malkiel, B. (2005). Reflections on the efficient market hypothesis: 30 Years later. The 
Financial Review, 40(1), 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0732-8516.2005.00090.x 
 
Merton, R. (1973). An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica  
(pre-1986), 41(5), 867. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913811 
 
Nguyen, A. & Roberge, M. (2008). Timing the stock market with a joint examination of 
the Presidential election cycle and the yield curve. Studies in Economics and Fi-
nance, 25(3), 152-164. doi:10.1108/10867370810894684 
 
Nippani, S. & Arize, A. (2005). U.S. Presidential election impact on Canadian and Mexi 
can stock markets. Journal of Economics and Finance, 29(2), 271-279. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02761558 
 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1975). The political business cycle. The Review of Economic Studies, 
42(2), 169-190. https://doi.org/10.2307/229652 
 
74 
Oehler, A., Walker, T. J. & Wendt, S. (2013). Effects of election results on stock price 
performance: Evidence from 1980 to 2008. Managerial Finance, 39(8), 714-736. 
 https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-May-2012-0126 
 
Riley, W. & Luksetich, W. (1980). The Market prefers Republicans: myth or reality.  
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 15(3), 541. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2330399 
 
Roll, R. (1981). A possible explanation of the small firm effect. The Journal of Finance, 
 36(4), 879. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04890.x 
 
Sabherwal, S., Sarkar, S. K. & Uddin, M. R. (2017). Political party affiliation of the Presi- 
dent, majority in congress, and sin stock returns. Financial Management, 46(1), 
3-31. doi:10.1111/fima.12141 
 
Santa-Clara, P. & Valkanov, R. (2003). The Presidential puzzle: political cycles and the  
stock market. Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1841-1872.
 https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00590 
 
Sawitri, N. & Astuty, P. (2018). Market anomalies and effect on returns. European 
Research Studies Journal, 21(2), 630-649. 
 
Shaikh, I. (2017). The 2016 U.S. Presidential election and the Stock, FX and VIX markets. 
The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 42, 546-563. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2017.08.014 
 





Stovall, R. H. (1992). Forecasting stock market performance via the Presidential 
cycle. Financial Analysts Journal, 48(3), 5-8. 
 
Sturm, R. R. (2011). Economic policy and the Presidential election cycle in stock returns. 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 1-16. doi:10.1007/s12197-011-9179-6 
 
Sturm, R. (2013). Economic policy and the Presidential election cycle in stock returns. 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 37(2), 200-215. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12197-011-9179-6 
 
Sultonov, M. & Jehan, S. N. (2018). Dynamic linkages between Japan’s foreign exchange 
and stock markets: response to the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presi- 
dential election. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 11(3), 34. 
https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm11030034 
 
Weldon, H. (1996). That Presidential election cycle theory. Business and Economic Re- 
view, 43(1), 37. 
 
Weldon, H. W. (2008). The Presidential election theory cycle (Redux). Business and 
Economic Review, 54(2), 19-21. 
 
Wong, W. & Mcaleer, M. (2009). Mapping the Presidential election cycle in US stock 
markets. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 79(11), 3267-3277. 
doi:10.1016/j.matcom.2009.05.007 
 
Zhao, K., Liano, K. and William, G.H. (2004), Presidential election cycles and the turn- 
of-the-month effect, Social Science Quarterly, 85(4), 958-73. 
 
 
 
